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PERSPECTIVES ON FISHER V.
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AND THE
STRICT SCRUTINY STANDARD IN
THE UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS
CONTEXT
Michael Poreda*
I. INTRODUCTION
This term, the United States Supreme Court will weigh in
again on the constitutionality of race-conscious college
admissions in a case called Fisher v. University of Texas at
Austin. This issue was last addressed in 2003 in the twin cases
of Grutter v. Bollinger1 and Gratz v. Bollinger.2 In Gratz v.
Bollinger, the Court held 6-3 that it was unconstitutional for a
university to assign a pre-determined point value to an
applicant based on minority status alone.3 In the more critical
case Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court held by a 5-4 majority that
the holistic and individualized consideration of race during
the admissions process is narrowly tailored to meet a
university’s compelling interest in assembling a diverse student
body.4
The University of Texas, which the Fifth Circuit had
previously banned from considering the race of its applicants
in Hopwood v. Texas,5 implemented a new admission program
following Grutter that took limited consideration of the race

*
B.A., Rutgers University—New Brunswick, 2003; M.A., Teachers College—
Columbia University, 2005; J.D., Seton Hall University, 2010. Mr. Poreda practices civil
rights and education litigation at Methfessel & Werbel in Edison, New Jersey. He is
the co-author of the New York City Bar Association’s amicus brief in Fisher v.
University of Texas at Austin. He thanks the members of the City Bar’s Committee on
Education & the Law and Committee on Civil Rights who read his drafts and offered
helpful comments.
1
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
2
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
3
Id. at 270.
4
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
5
Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000).
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of some of its applicants.6 Before Grutter overruled Hopwood,
the University of Texas had preserved racial diversity on
campus through its Top Ten Percent Plan, which admitted all
Texas applicants ranked in the top ten percent of their high
school classes. Although this plan reduced the university’s
ability to be truly selective with its student body, the racial
imbalance of Texas’s geographical regions assured the
university that this plan would prevent a precipitous drop in
the university’s population of black and Hispanic students in
the wake of Hopwood.7 Since Grutter, the University of Texas
has continued to use the Top Ten Percent Plan, under which
60 to 80 percent of undergraduates are admitted, but it also has
included race as one of many relevant factors in its second-tier
admissions process, which consists of a more traditional
individualized assessment of an applicant’s academic and
personal merits.8 In this second-tier process, the race of some
applicants receives limited consideration.9
Although Grutter held that race-conscious admissions were
acceptable, it still encouraged experimentation with raceneutral alternatives like the Top Ten Percent Plan. Ironically, it
is the University of Texas’ experimental hybridization of the
race-neutral Top Ten Percent Plan and the race-conscious
second-tier plan that became the fodder for the Fisher case.
PetitionerAbigail Fisher, a white student who was not in the
top ten percent of her high school class and was not admitted,10
claims that the University of Texas used “racial classifications”
in a way that violated her right to equal protection under the
laws.
By way of background, all government uses of “racial
classifications” are subject to “strict scrutiny review” under the
Equal Protection Clause. The strict scrutiny analysis that the
Court applies to racial classifications requires the university to
prove that any racial classification is “narrowly tailored” to

6

Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 225 (5th Cir. 2011).
See Brief for Respondent at 8, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213
(5th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-345).
8
Id.
9
Id. at 10–11. See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 227.
10
Fisher has since graduated from another college. See Brief for Respondent,
supra note 7, at 17.
7
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meet a compelling interest.11 The Court’s language describing
strict scrutiny as a “most exacting” standard under which all
ambiguities must be construed against the government12
suggests that few racial classifications could withstand it.
Various decisions have fashioned tests aimed at “ferreting out”
any loose threads in the racial classification’s “narrowly
tailoring” to a “compelling state interest.”13 Notably, cases
reviewed under strict scrutiny require the serious examination
of race-neutral alternatives before concluding that a racial
classification is narrowly tailored.14 Although race-conscious
admissions have been justified by a compelling interest in
campus diversity—though Grutter stated that race-conscious
admissions must eventually come to an end15—the petitioner in
Fisher has attacked the university’s hybrid race-neutral/raceconscious scheme for achieving campus diversity on two
grounds.16 First, she argues that the Top Ten Percent Plan was
so successful at producing campus diversity that it eliminated
the compelling interest warranting race-conscious admissions.17
Second, she argues that the use of race is not narrowly tailored
for several reasons, including the fact that race only enters the
admissions equation under very limited circumstances.
In spite of these arguments, it seems virtually certain that
the University of Texas’s plan does comply with the mandates
of Grutter. Even Judge Garza of the Fifth Circuit, whose
concurring opinion harshly criticized Grutter and the very
institution of race-conscious admissions itself, conceded that
the University of Texas’s program was constitutional within
the existing Grutter standard.18
The university’s brief very deftly deflates each of the
petitioner’s arguments and sub-arguments, except for the

11

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 267 (1978); see also Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 742 (2007).
13
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 500 (2005). See also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.
14
See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509–10 (1989); Parents
Involved, 551 U.S. at 704 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339).
15
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342.
16
Id. at 328–33.
17
Brief for Petitioner at 35–36, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th
Cir. 2011) (No.11-345).
18
Fisher, 631 F.3d at 247.
12
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petitioner’s last argument, which may be the most important in
asking the Court to reconsider its holding in Grutter.19
The university’s counterargument was simply that stare
decisis concerns should prevent an overturning of Grutter.20
While stare decisis is a valid argument, it does not go to the
core of the problem. The petitioner has challenged Grutter on
a fundamental level. Specifically, the petitioner argues that
Grutter erred by giving universities a level of good faith
deference in their implementation of race-conscious
admissions.21 True strict scrutiny, the petitioner argues,
tolerates no such deference.22 What is more, it is somewhat
difficult to believe that the Court would have granted
certiorari in this case unless it considered overruling Grutter in
some respects, although the use of race at the University of
Texas is substantially more limited than it was in the
University of Michigan Law School (“Michigan Law School”)
process held constitutional in Grutter. Furthermore, the
petitioner’s arguments about the application of Grutter are not
terribly convincing, except for the one that attacks Grutter’s
interpretation of strict scrutiny itself.
This Article explores ways that the University might have
handled this most pressing question more fundamentally than
appealing to an interest in stare decisis. Part II reviews the basic
standard for the constitutional use of race-conscious
admissions, as developed through the main race-conscious
admissions cases, as well as other Equal Protection cases. The
rest of the Article explores fundamental approaches to
overcoming the plaintiff’s arguments about strict scrutiny.
Part III addresses whether the University’s use of race in the
admissions process is even a “racial classification” warranting
Equal Protection review in the first place. Part IV explores the
possibility that universities have a compelling interest in a
transparent student selection process, which cannot possibly
occur without the use of race. Part V argues that strict scrutiny
itself is context-sensitive and flexible and that the Court
should officially recognize that the rigidity of strict scrutiny

19
20
21
22

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 53.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 7, at 50–54.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 53–57.
Id. at 54 (citations omitted).
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should be subject to slackening in certain contexts.
II. BASIC STANDARD: RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS
PROCESSES THAT DO NOT INSULATE MINORITIES FROM
COMPETITION WITH ALL OTHER CANDIDATES ARE
CONSTITUTIONAL
In a series of three cases, Regents of University of
California v. Bakke, Gratz v. Bollinger, and Grutter v.
Bollinger, the Supreme Court has specified what does and does

not constitute an acceptable use of race in the university
admissions process.23 In these cases, the Court forbade
universities from conferring discrete benefits based solely on
race but permitted universities to holistically consider the race
of applicants, so long as race was not considered in a way that
insulated minorities from competition with all other
candidates.24
In University of California v. Bakke, the Court held that
setting aside a certain number of seats in a class for minority
students violated the Equal Protection Clause.25 In Gratz v.
Bollinger, the Court forbade the University of Michigan from
giving undergraduate candidates twenty points—one-fifth of
the points needed to earn admission—just for being
minorities.26 This automatic award assured admission for
virtually every minimally qualified minority applicant.27 While
the holdings in Bakke and Gratz specified what a university
could not do when considering an applicant’s race, these cases
also made it clear that universities can constitutionally use race
as a “plus factor” in the admissions process.28 Grutter v.
Bollinger’s importance lay in its incorporation of the
constitutionality of considering race as a “plus factor” into its
holding.29
Using the factor of race, among other factors, is critical to

23

Grutter and Gratz were decided together on June 23, 2003.
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978); Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003).
25
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 266–67.
26
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 255 (2003).
27
Id. at 266, 272.
28
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 295.
29
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 391–92.
24
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a school’s right to assemble a heterogeneous student body.30
The key to the constitutional use of race is that it must not
“insulate the individual from comparison with all other
candidates for the available seats.”31 A program is constitutional
where it “treats each applicant as an individual in the
admissions process.”32 As the Court in Grutter stated, “The
importance of this individualized consideration in the context
of a race-conscious admissions program is paramount.”33
In Bakke, the plaintiff was a white applicant to the
University of California—Davis medical school who was
denied admission.34 He argued that the medical school had
violated his rights to equal protection because it did not
consider his application for the sixteen seats that were reserved
for members of disadvantaged minority groups.35 The Court
agreed that the medical school had a racial quota, which it held
unconstitutional.36
In the Bakke opinion, Justice Powell used the example of
Harvard College to illustrate a constitutional race-conscious
admissions process—an example which would later influence
Grutter and Gratz. At Harvard, the admissions officials were
allowed to consider racial and ethnic background, among other
factors that would help contribute to a diverse student body,
the definition of “diversity” being necessarily fluid.37 Race
could “tip” a decision just as “geographic origin” or a “life
spent on a farm.”38 Being a member of a minority group does
not necessarily become “decisive” to the decision.39 An ItalianAmerican would still be chosen over an African-American if
the Italian-American had overall qualities that would be more
likely to promote “educational pluralism.”40 Ultimately, “[t]he
applicant who loses out on the last available seat to another

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 318.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276.
Id. at 277–78.
Id. at 266.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 323.
Id. at 317.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318.
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candidate receiving a ‘plus’ on the basis of ethnic background
will not have been foreclosed from all consideration for that
seat simply because he was not the right color or had the
wrong surname.”41 No goals or quotas existed for the number
of racial minorities to be admitted, but Harvard did keep track
of the numbers of admitted students in various categories.42
In a similar vein, the Harvard program was constitutional
because it did not make incorrect assumptions about a person
based on race alone. Although the constitutionality of the
Harvard program was not at stake in Bakke, the Harvard
program became the model of acceptable race-conscious
admissions as the standard against which the University of
Michigan’s undergraduate admissions program was ruled
unconstitutional in Gratz.43 The unconstitutionality of the
undergraduate University of Michigan program was rooted
not only in its failure to expose minority applicants to holistic
review, but in its incorrect assumption that a minority
student’s race alone brought some predetermined, quantifiable
measure of diversity to the school.44 In her concurring
opinion, Justice O’Connor emphasized that what made the
University of Michigan’s process unconstitutional was its lack
of “meaningful individualized review” and its automatic
award of twenty points was given to every minority.45
In contrast, the Michigan Law School admissions program
held constitutional in Grutter essentially adopted the Harvard
model:
Here, the Law School engages in a highly individualized,
holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving serious
consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to
a diverse educational environment. The Law School affords
this individualized consideration to applicants of all races.
41
42
43

Id. at 318.
Id. at 316–17.

Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270–76 (2003).
See id. at 271 (stating that the Harvard plan was constitutional because it did
not assume that a person’s race “automatically ensured a specific and identifiable
contribution to a university’s diversity”); see also id. at 273–74 (“[T]he result of the
automatic distribution of 20 points is that the University would never consider [a
minority student’s] individual background, experiences, and characteristics to assess his
individual ‘potential contribution to diversity.’ Instead, every [minority applicant]
would simply be admitted.”).
45
Id. at 276.
44
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There is no policy, either de jure or de facto, of automatic
acceptance or rejection based on any single “soft” variable.
Unlike the program at issue in Gratz v. Bollinger, the Law
School awards no mechanical, predetermined diversity
“bonuses” based on race or ethnicity.46
The University of Texas at issue in Fisher affords all of its
candidates the same type of individualized review as Harvard
College or Michigan Law School. An applicant’s race is one of
many factors considered in a broad assessment called a
“personal achievement score,” which is used to assess
candidates whose merit as applicants is not fully reflected by
their academic achievement.47 The “personal achievement
score” includes an “applicant’s demonstrated leadership
qualities, awards and honors, work experience, and
involvement in extracurricular activities and community
service.”48 Additionally, it incorporates
“a ‘special
circumstances’ element that may reflect the socioeconomic
status of the applicant and his or her high school, the
applicant’s family status and family responsibilities, the
applicant’s standardized test score compared to the average of
her high school, and—beginning in 2004—the applicant’s
race.”49 The use of race at the University of Texas therefore
fits the basic parameter for a constitutional use of race because
it requires individualized review and does not award
candidates any discrete benefit based solely on race.In fact, the
University of Texas’s program is even more restrained and
prudent in its use of race than the constitutional programs in
Bakke and Grutter, having been adjusted to address the
concerns expressed in Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent by
assuring that “individual assessment is safeguarded through
the entire process.”50
46

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003) (citations omitted).
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 228 (5th Cir. 2011).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice
Kennedy expressed concern that race was “likely outcome determinative” in the
decisions about who would fill the seats in the bottom fifteen to twenty percent of
the class. Id. This concern arose because admissions officials monitored the racial
composition of the incoming class on a “day-to-day” basis and could “recalibrate the
plus factor given to race depending on how close they were to achieving the Law’s
School’s goal of critical mass.” Id. at 392. This system of monitoring racial composition,
47
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Only a minority of applicants not admitted under the
University of Texas’s Top Ten Percent Plan might have their
race considered during the second-tier admissions process.51 In
this second-tier process, applicants are assigned two numbers:
an Academic Index (“AI”), and a Personal Achievement Index
(“PAI”).52 Both scores are assigned long before officials make
any decision about who to admit or deny.53 If the applicant’s AI
score is high enough, the applicant is admitted based on that
score alone.54 If the applicant’s scores are not high enough, the
application is “presumptively denied.”55 On rare occasions,
senior admissions staff may “designate [a presumptively
denied] file for full review notwithstanding the AI score.”56
The PAI, which has been in effect since 1997, was designed
to “identify and reward students whose merit as applicants was
not adequately reflected by their class rank and test scores.”57
The PAI is based on three scores: one score for each of two
required essays and a third score—the personal achievement
score discussed above—which represents an evaluation of the
applicant’s entire file.58 The essays are each given a score
between one and six through “a holistic evaluation of the essay
as a piece of writing based on its complexity of thought,
substantiality of development, and facility with language.”59
The personal achievement score is also based on a scale of one
to six, although it is given slightly greater weight in the final
PAI calculation than the mean of the two essay scores.60
The Fifth Circuit61 explained the place of race in
while not limiting the size of the plus factor, created a likelihood that “individual
consideration” was not preserved at the end of the admission season. Id. at 389.
51
Fisher, 631 F.3d at 227–28.
52
Id. at 222–23.
53
Brief for Respondent, supra note 7, at 13.
54
Fisher, 631 F.3d at 227.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 223 (citing Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d. 587, 591
(W.D. Tex. 2009)).
58
Id. at 227.
59
Id. (citing Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 597).
60
Id. at 228.
61
In the Fifth Circuit Fisher appeal, 631 F.3d 213, 215 (5th Cir. 2011), the
petitioners Abigail Fisher and Rachel Michalewicz claimed that the race-conscious
second-tier process violated their rights to equal protection by discriminating against
them on the basis of race.
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calculating the personal achievement score in detail,
demonstrating that minority applicants at the University of
Texas are not given any discrete benefit just for being a
member of a minority group:
None of the elements of the personal achievement score—
including race—are considered individually or given separate
numerical values to be added together. Rather, the file is
evaluated as a whole in order to provide the fullest possible
understanding of the student as a person and to place his or her
achievements in context. As UT’s director of admissions
explained, “race provides—like [the] language [spoken in the
applicant’s home], whether or not someone is the first in their
family to attend college, and family responsibilities—important
context in which to evaluate applicants, and is only one aspect
of the diversity that the University seeks to attain.” Race is
considered as part of the applicant’s context whether or not the
applicant belongs to a minority group, and so—at least in
theory—it “can positively impact applicants of all races,
including Caucasian[s], or [it] may have no impact whatsoever.”
Moreover, given the mechanics of UT’s admissions process,
race has the potential to influence only a small part of the
applicant’s overall admissions score. The sole instance when
race is considered is as one element of the personal
achievement score, which itself is only a part of the total PAI.
Without a sufficiently high AI and well-written essays, an
applicant with even the highest personal achievement score
will still be denied admission.62
Perhaps most importantly, the University of Texas does not
keep a running tally of the racial composition of its incoming
class.63 Thus, at the end of each admissions cycle, University of
Texas officials will not inflate the size of the “plus” factor
given to race in an effort to meet a particular racial goal. This
eliminates the fear, expressed by Justice Kennedy in his dissent
in Grutter, that candidates at the bottom of the admitted class
will be selected solely, or almost solely, based on their race.64

62
63

Id. at 228–29 (citations omitted).
Id. at 236 (“[D]emographics are not consulted as part of any individual

admissions decision, and UT’s admissions procedures do not treat certain racial groups
or minorities differently than others when reviewing individual applications.”).
64
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 389–93 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Accordingly, the University’s first argument in its brief is
that its race-conscious admissions plan conforms closely to the
dictates of the prior case law.65 But compliance with prior case
law may not be what the Court is going to scrutinize in this
case. The Supreme Court may well evaluate whether the
underlying decision in Grutter was actually constitutional. If
that is what the Supreme Court intends to do, then Fisher calls
for more fundamental arguments about Equal Protection.
III. THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS DOES NOT EMPLOY “RACIAL
CLASSIFICATIONS” SUBJECT TO STRICT SCRUTINY REVIEW
Throughout the course of the Fisher litigation, the parties
and courts have taken for granted that the plaintiff stated an
Equal Protection claim by virtue of the University’s use of
“racial classifications.” All governmental uses of “racial
classifications” are subject to “strict scrutiny review” under the
Equal Protection Clause.66 There is an argument to be made,
however, that the University of Texas did not use “racial
classifications” warranting strict scrutiny review.
The Supreme Court has never defined what a “racial
classification” is, and this case presents an opportunity for the
pinning down of the contours of a definition. There are two
possible definitions that could have been argued by the
University of Texas. First, the University of Texas could have
argued that a racial classification is a discrete, automatic action
based solely on race that does not take consideration of any of
the individual or attending circumstances. Virtually every
previous case would tolerate such a definition, except possibly
Grutter where it might contend with the Court’s assumption
that racial classifications existed at Michigan Law School in
Grutter. However, the University could have argued for a
second, slightly wider definition of racial classifications,
which would have accommodated Grutter but still result in a
victory for the University of Texas: a government action that
entails a risk that race could become the predominant factor in
any admissions decision.

65
66

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 23.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995).
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A. “Racial Classifications” as Racial Preferences or Discrete
Actions Based Solely on Race
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly defined
“racial classification,” the First Circuit provides some
guidance.67 In Raso v. Lago, the court held that an affirmative
action clause attached to a company’s receipt of federal funds
for the construction of a housing development was not a racial
classification warranting review under the Equal Protection
Clause.68 The affirmative action clause required the recipient
of federal construction funds to actively encourage minorities
to purchase homes in the development through “mailings to
minority organizations, assurances of nondiscrimination, and
like measures . . . but it did not require the developer to prefer
members of minority races.”69 The court explained that the
term “racial classification” normally “refers to a governmental
standard, preferentially favorable to one race or another, for
the distribution of benefits.”70
That a racial classification is tantamount to a “racial
preference” is implicit in the frequent use of the term “racial
preference” in the language of the most notable and recent
Equal Protection cases, where it is semantically interchangeable
with the term “racial classification.” The semantic
interchangeability of the terms “racial classification” and
“racial preference” is apparent not only from a reading of
those cases, but also in the high frequency with which the
Court used the latter term in those cases. In Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co.—a case that involved the constitutionality of an
affirmative action program requiring the government to prefer
contracts with minority-owned businesses—the Court refers to
“preferences” of a racial nature twenty-nine times.71 In
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, another government
contracting case, the Court mentions racial “preferences”
thirty-six times,72 followed by eighteen times in Grutter.73

67

Raso v. Lago, 135 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 1998).
Id. at 16.
69
Id. at 13–14.
70
Id. at 16 (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226–27; City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
71
Croson, 488 U.S. 469.
72
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 200.
68
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Moreover, the Court often uses the term “racial preference” to
define the trigger for strict scrutiny.74
Although a racial classification is identical to a racial
preference in an affirmative action context, “racial
classification” must have a more expansive definition, for in
some cases, racial classifications exist even when there is no
unequal distribution of benefits or burdens. In Johnson v.
California, the Court held that strict scrutiny applied to a
policy that automatically segregated prisoners by race in order
to avoid racially-motivated gang violence.75 The Court has also
held in Shaw v. Reno that blatant gerrymandering to create
majority-minority voting districts warranted strict scrutiny
review.76
Even though these cases did not involve “preferences,” they
were still subject to strict scrutiny review because, like
preferences, the government actions in these cases were based
solely upon racial assumptions, stigma, and stereotypes; the
government took these actions without consideration of the
individuality of those affected. In Johnson, for example, the
Court wrote that what made the racial separation of prisoners
suspect for Equal Protection violation was the use of “race as a
proxy for gang membership and violence” without any
individualized assessment of the prisoner or the facility.77
Similarly, in Shaw, the Court wrote that racial classifications
threaten “to stigmatize individuals by reason of their
membership in a racial group,”78 noting that race-based
gerrymandering perpetuated “stereotypical notions about
members of the same racial group—that they think alike, share
the same political interests, and prefer the same candidates.”79
That a racial classification amounts to some unwarranted
assumption about a person based solely on race is eminently

73

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223 (“[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic
criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examination.” (quoting Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986) (emphasis added))).
75
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 499–501 (2005).
76
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993).
77
Johnson, 543 U.S. at 518, 521. Cf. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1990) (“Race
cannot be a proxy for determining juror bias or competence.”).
78
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643.
79
Id. at 631.
74
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clear in college admissions cases, too, where the Court cites as
its main constitutional concern applicants’ individualized
review.80
In a similar vein, it is important to note that in order for a
racial classification to exist, the government must take a
discrete action based solely on race. This is evident in the very
language of the cases. In Bakke, for example, the Court wrote,
“Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry
are by their very nature odious to a free people whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”81 The
affirmative action and college admissions cases have made it
clear that a racial classification exists where a government
action occurs solely because of race but not when race is simply
acknowledged in a more complex, openly competitive process.82
Given this body of case law, the University of Texas does
not employ “racial classifications” subject to strict scrutiny
review. As discussed at length in Part II, the University’s
consideration of race is not a preference and is not tied to
automatic assumptions about the applicant based solely on race.
More fundamentally, the University takes no discrete action
based solely upon race. Admissions officers give no award of
admission or even an award of a particular number of points
based on race alone. Any deference given to a student is not
based solely on his race, but on race in the context of other
relevant socio-economic indicators that demonstrate personal
merits not reflected in a purely academic profile.83

80

See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1978); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276 (2003).
81
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290–91 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81,
100 (1943) (emphasis added)); see also id. at 305 (citing McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents,
339 U.S. 637, 641–42 (1950)) (“When a classification denies an individual opportunities or
benefits enjoyed by others solely because of his race or ethnic background, it must be
regarded as suspect.” (emphasis added)); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 493 (1989) (“The Richmond Plan denies certain citizens the opportunity to compete
for a fixed percentage of public contracts based solely upon their race.” (emphasis
added)); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 262 (1995) (“Such review
prevents ineligible firms from taking part in the program solely because of their
minority ownership.” (emphasis added)); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 246 (2003)
(finding it unconstitutional to award a minority applicant twenty points “solely
because of race” (emphasis added)).
82
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
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Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 223 (5th Cir. 2011).
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B. “Racial Classifications” Where There is a Risk of Race
Becoming a Predominant Factor in a Decision
Defining “racial classifications” as racial preferences or
discrete acts based solely on race would cause some tension
with Grutter. Grutter unquestioningly assumed that racial
classifications existed at Michigan Law School even though
their admissions program did not employ preferences based
solely on race. In fact, the Court upheld the admissions
program because the decision to admit or deny was not based
solely on race. A slightly wider definition of “racial
classifications” could keep the assumption of racial preferences
in Grutter consistent with a finding of no racial classifications
in Fisher.
Principles espoused in the voting redistricting cases that
followed the 1990 census strongly indicate that racial
classifications do not exist unless race forms the predominant
basis upon which the government takes a discrete action.
Summarizing prior case holdings, Justice O’Connor wrote in
Bush v. Vera,
Strict scrutiny applies where . . . “race for its own sake, and
not other districting principles, was the legislature’s dominant
and controlling rationale in drawing its district lines’ and ‘the
legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting
principles . . . to racial considerations.” Strict scrutiny does
not apply merely because redistricting is performed with
consciousness of race.84
Essentially, this holding means that race-consciousness
alone is not evidence of a racial classification.
A
racial
classification cannot exist unless racial considerations dominate
a decision-making process.
In order to accommodate the assumption of racial
classifications in Grutter, however, the definition would have
to be expanded further to include not just instances where race
dominates a decision-making process, but where there is a risk
that race could dominate. Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter
noted that there was a substantial risk that race would
dominate the decisions about who would fill the last fifteen

84

Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996) (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646
(1993); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995)) (internal citations omitted).
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to twenty percent of seats of the incoming class at Michigan
Law School. Because admissions officials could inflate the size
of the “plus” given to race in order to meet diversity goals, race
could become the predominant factor in those late-season
decisions.85 The risk of some race-dominated decisions at
Michigan Law School makes it potentially subject to Equal
Protection violation, thus warranting a finding that the law
school used racial classifications.
The University of Texas took Justice Kennedy’s dissent
seriously and completely eliminated the risk of any single
admissions decision being racially dominated by numerically
confining the role that race can play in any one decision and
by not keeping track of the racial composition of its incoming
class during the admissions season.86
A definition of “racial classification” that narrows it to
discrete government actions based predominantly on race
would be almost entirely consistent with previous case law and
would give universities some repose with respect to their raceconscious admissions decisions. It is an argument that will not
be considered in Fisher, but which perhaps may be considered
in a future battle over race-conscious admissions.
IV. THE UNIVERSITY HAS A COMPELLING INTEREST IN A
TRANSPARENT ADMISSIONS PROCESS
The University of Texas also did not argue that the Court
should recognize that the University’s use of race is narrowly
tailored to further a compelling interest in a transparent
admission process. This interest is inherent in Court precedent
on academic freedom.87
The finding in Bakke that a university has a compelling
85
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 389–92 (“Without a sufficiently high AI and well-written
essays, an applicant with even the highest personal achievement score will still be
denied admission.”).
86
Fisher, 631 F.3d at 236.
87
See Robert J. Tepper & Craig G. White, Speak No Evil: Academic Freedom
and the Application of Garcetti v. Ceballos to Public University Faculty, 59 CATH. U.
L. REV. 125, 126-146 (2009) and Amy H. Candido, Comment, A Right to Talk Dirty?:
Academic Freedom Values and Sexual Harassment in the University Classroom, 4 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 85, 86 (1997) for general discussions of the connection
between academic freedom and the First Amendment. See also Erica Goldberg & Kelly
Sarabyn, Measuring A “Degree of Deference”: Institutional Academic Freedom in A
Post-Grutter World, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 217, 239 (2011).
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interest in creating campus diversity is rooted in First
Amendment rights to academic freedom.88 Universities have
the freedom to make their own “judgments as to education,”
including “the selection of its student body.”89 This is one of
the “four essential freedoms” of a university—”to determine
for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study.”90 In Grutter, Justice O’Connor’s decision to hold
Michigan Law School’s use of race constitutional was rooted
in this right.91 If universities have a compelling interest rooted
in the First Amendment to select their own student bodies,
then it follows that the University of Texas has a compelling
interest in obtaining a complete and transparent picture of its
applicants. This simply cannot happen unless the students can
report their race in their application.
Racial classifications are traditionally held suspect because
race is so frequently irrelevant to achieving a legitimate
government interest.92 The Court has conceded, however, that
race may be relevant in two instances. First, race may be
relevant where the government has an interest in “eliminating
the pernicious vestiges of past discrimination.”93 Second, in
Grutter, the Court held that race was relevant to the
compelling interest of creating campus diversity.94
Race is also relevant to a transparent admission process.
Universities seek more in their student bodies than the most
academically qualified students.95 They also seek personal
88
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978); Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
89
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
90
Id. (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in result)).
91
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328–29 (2003) (“Our holding today is in
keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university’s academic
decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits.”).
92
See, e.g.,Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 301 (1986); Hirabayashi
v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)
(stating that strict scrutiny has been rooted in the unfairness of considering an
“immutable characteristic unrelated to a person’s ability to perform or contribute to
society.”).
93
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 301.
94
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328–33.
95
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (noting that a diverse student body is essential to
the exchange of ideas).
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qualities that indicate a potential for contribution or success
that cannot be reflected solely in academic terms.96 While race
alone does not bespeak any potential for contribution or
success, it is a relevant factor because it can be an important
part of the applicant’s identity and personal history.97 A
person’s racial identity can communicate important personal
qualities to an admissions official, and the benefit is not
limited to underprivileged minorities.98 As the District Court
and Fifth Circuit noted in Fisher, an applicant who takes an
active leadership role in his community would not be
evaluated in the same way as a white student who takes an
active leadership role in a predominantly Hispanic
community.99 If a university cannot actively inquire into the
racial identity of candidates, the social nuances of racial
identity, which may indicate special qualities in certain
candidates, will be lost. This loss constitutes a serious
infringement of a university’s First Amendment right to make
informed choices about who will study at its institution. This
loss substantially outweighs the questionable harms that the
petitioner alleges befall non-minority candidates under the
University of Texas’ admissions process.100
To the extent that the petitioner or her amici may argue
that the consideration of race permits admission officials to
perpetuate stereotypes about low minority ability, that
argument is fundamentally flawed for three reasons. First,
officially eliminating the consideration of race alone will not
prevent admissions officials from making race-influenced
judgments. Second, the undue level of opacity that comes with
eliminating race from applications can result in mistaken
judgments on the part of admissions officials. Third, making
96

Id. at 317 (“Such qualities could include exceptional personal talents, unique
work or service experience, leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a
history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate with the poor, or other
qualifications deemed important.”).
97
Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis, Language and Silence: Making
Systems of Privilege Visible, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 881, 900 (1995) (stating that race
has the power to “shape our vision of the world and of ourselves.”).
98
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 236 (5th Cir. 2011).
99
Id.
100
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 309 (2003) (noting that the University of
Michigan’s Law School admission process did not “unduly harm nonminority
applicants.”).
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the admissions process entirely race-blind is itself a harm that is
worse than a measured consideration of race.
Even if candidates do not report race, the race of
candidates is often evident from names and addresses. An
admission official is likely to assume that a candidate named
Oscar Salazar from the Rio Grande Valley is Hispanic and
probably Mexican, and that assumption may trigger an
admissions official’s sympathies or prejudices towards
Mexican-American applicants as he holistically evaluates the
applicant’s merits. Even more importantly, racial assumptions
based on last names and addresses could be entirely wrong.
Oscar Salazar from the Rio Grande Valley who has taken an
active role in the immigrants’ rights movement could be a
fourth-generation Texan with one Hispanic great-greatgrandparent. Schools should be allowed to inquire into a
candidate’s race in order to eliminate the level of opaqueness
that a completely race-blind process would create.
Lastly, even if there is a risk that consideration of race in
the context of academic achievement has a potential to
perpetuate an expectation of lower minority academic
achievement, making the process race-blind plays into an
equally, if not more shameful history of failing “to confront
the complexity of the issue in a candid and critical manner.”101
There is substantial evidence that key indicators of academic
success, namely standardized tests, have built-in racial
prejudices.102 Pretending that this pervasive, if unintentional,
prejudice does not exist is more harmful than engaging in it.
Even if the studies indicating that standardized tests prejudice
minority students have been subject to doubt, the Court’s
decision to take a side in that debate would require it to make
“complex educational judgments in an area that lies primarily
within the expertise of the university.”103 The obvious
101

CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS 2 (1993).

102

See William C. Kidder & Jay Rosner, How the SAT Creates “Built-in
Headwinds”: An Educational and Legal Analysis of Disparate Impact, 43 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 131, 139 (2002) (citing Grutter, 288 F.3d 732); see also Claude Steele &
Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African
Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 797 (1995); Amicus Brief of The College
Board and The National School Boards Ass’n at 22 (framing the issue as the SAT only
being a single, imperfect predictor of academic success and criterion in who should be
admitted to a university).
103
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 at 328.
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compromise between the two concerns is the one that has been
in play since Bakke was decided in 1978—to permit a holistic
evaluation of a candidate’s race in the context of all other
relevant factors.
Depriving universities of the right to consider the race of
candidates creates an unnecessary and detrimental layer of
opaqueness in the admissions process. If universities have a
compelling interest in choosing who will attend, then they
should be able to transparently learn the race of their
candidates and how this racial identity has influenced their
lives. There is no race-neutral way to accomplish this goal, and
so the University of Texas’ race-conscious process is narrowly
tailored to the compelling interest in a transparent admissions
process.104
V. THE COURT SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT STRICT SCRUTINY
WITH DEFERENCE AS APPLIED IN GRUTTER IS APPROPRIATE
BECAUSE EQUAL PROTECTION SCRUTINY IS FLEXIBLE AND
CONTEXT-SENSITIVE
In his concurring Fifth Circuit opinion in Fisher, Judge
Garza called into question whether any race-conscious
admissions standard could ever withstand strict scrutiny.105
While Judge Garza conceded that the Fifth Circuit
appropriately applied the standard from Grutter, he criticized
Grutter for applying “a standard markedly less demanding”
than strict scrutiny.106 This may be the issue that the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in order to evaluate, and it calls for an
argument about the meaning of strict scrutiny itself.
Judge Garza may be right that no race-conscious program
could ever withstand “strict scrutiny” in its “most exacting”
form, but he overlooks the fact that the three-tiered scrutiny
system is flexible to context.107 During the 1970s, 1980s, and
104

See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509–10 (1989) (requiring
consideration of race-neutral alternatives before finding that a racial classification is
narrowly tailored); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339 (“Narrow tailoring does not require
exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative.”).
105
See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 247 (5th Cir. 2011) (Garza, J.,
concurring) (“To be specific, race now matters in university admissions, where, if strict
scrutiny where properly applied, it should not.”).
106
Id.
107
See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L.
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1990s, for example, the Court developed what observers have
called “rational basis with bite” for traditionally non-suspect
classifications.108 In several notable cases, such as City of
Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center,109 U. S. Department
of Agriculture v. Moreno,110 and Romer v. Evans,111 the Court
subjected traditionally non-suspect classifications (disability,
co-habitant status, and sexual orientation, respectively) to
heightened scrutiny even though it never formally departed
from “rational basis review.” In these cases, the Court
functionally departed from the “usual deference associated
with rational basis review” because the legislation at issue “was
in fact intended to further an improper government
objective.”112
Likewise, Bakke and Grutter have clearly carved out a
relaxed form of strict scrutiny that is appropriate to the
particular context of college admissions. Both cases stated that
some level of deference should be afforded to colleges given
the tradition of academic freedom and the fact that college
admissions involve “complex educational judgments in an area
that lies primarily within the expertise of the university.”113
Even if this means that a university is able to escape the
strictest application of judicial scrutiny, it is appropriate given
this special context, especially where non-minority applicants
suffer no substantial harm.114 Although this particular level of
deference may depart from the strictest form of strict scrutiny,
like “rational basis with bite,” the relaxed version of strict
scrutiny sanctioned in Bakke and applied in Grutter is proper
given that the use of race does not spring from an improper
motive, as it furthers a compelling state interest, does not
unduly harm non-minorities, and has been used to further
appropriate ends for university admissions programs since the

REV. 481 (2004).
108
Am. Express Travel Related Services Co., Inc. v. Kentucky, 641 F.3d 685, 692
(6th Cir. 2011) (citing Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV.
747, 759–60 (2011)).
109
City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
110
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1970s.
As Justice O’Connor wrote in Grutter, “context matters” in
Equal Protection cases.115 In Adarand, the Court “made clear
that strict scrutiny must take ‘relevant differences’ into
account.”116 Taking a close look at context is the “fundamental
purpose” of strict scrutiny itself.117 To subject racial awareness
in the college admissions process to the same level of scrutiny
as miscegenation laws is a patent absurdity.118 If the Court is to
adhere to the label “strict scrutiny,” then there is very good
reason to nevertheless permit the application of “good faith
deference” granted by Bakke and Grutter. Otherwise, there
would be no place for race in the college admissions process.119
V. CONCLUSION
Given how tightly the University of Texas’ race-conscious
admissions program adheres to the standard of Grutter, it is
hard to believe that the Supreme Court would have granted
certiorari unless it was considering a modification of the
Grutter standard. The University of Texas has met the
challenge with an appeal to stare decisis interests. It is a good
argument, but perhaps not powerful enough to overcome what
could be a very probing inquiry into the meaning of strict
scrutiny of racial classifications. Should the Court’s decision
fail to completely and permanently resolve all doubts about
the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions, more
fundamental arguments about the very meaning of strict
scrutiny might be used to a university’s advantage in future
litigation.
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Id. at 308 (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343–344 (1960)).
Id. (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 228 (1995)).
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Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (holding that a law against

interracial marriage had “no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious
racial discrimination”) with Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)
(finding a compelling state interest in the creation of a diverse campus that can be
served through race-conscious admissions).
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